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I.  Introduction 
We must not say that every mistake is a foolish one.1 
In this Article I first argue that Section 62 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment sits in tension with the principles 
expounded in the rest of the work.  I then try to show that this tension is 
mostly unnecessary because the majority of the cases covered by Section 62 
could be either (1) explained by the rules of other sections or (2) dismissed 
as quaint products of a bygone era dominated by a robust conception of 
equity.  I conclude that the Section should not have been included in the 
Restatement.  However, in fairness, I must acknowledge that a reporter, 
striving to create a comprehensive Restatement, faces constant pressure to 
accommodate more cases, even though he may disagree with the reasoning 
within the cases.  Hence, overinclusion is to be expected.  Still, the 
inclusion of Section 62 remains a mistake, albeit not a foolish one. 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Adam Rigoni, University of Michigan.  Special thanks to Professor Douglas 
Laycock. 
 1. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE DIVINATIONE 2.90. 
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My criticism of Section 62 is limited to the illustrations discussed and 
the cases referenced in Comments a–b.  Comment c deals with limitations 
on the remedy a plaintiff receives in a restitution suit.  It is not clear why 
this aspect of calculating the plaintiff’s recovery is placed in a section 
ostensibly dealing with defenses to a claim of unjust enrichment.  
Moreover, Section 49’s rules for calculating recovery, which include a rule 
that the measurement of recovery varies with the culpability of the 
defendant, seem to render this portion of Section 62 redundant.  
Nevertheless, a full explication of these criticisms of Comment c would 
tread too far from the criticism of Comments a–b to merit discussion in this 
paper.  Hence, when I write of Section 62, I mean to refer to that Section 
sans Comment c. 
II.  The Tension Generated by Section 62 in General 
Section 62 states: 
Even if the claimant has conferred a benefit that results in the unjust 
enrichment of the recipient when viewed in isolation, the recipient may 
defend by showing some or all of the benefit conferred did not unjustly 
enrich the recipient when the challenged transaction is viewed in the 
context of the parties’ further obligations to each other.2 
This raises the following question:  Why is "no unjust enrichment" a 
defense to an allegation of unjust enrichment as opposed to a proper 
answer?  Kull responds by explaining: 
[T]he practical application  of the present rule is to [cases] . . . when the 
claimant alleges facts supporting a prima facie claim in unjust 
enrichment . . . but the recipient is able to show that the resulting 
enrichment is not unjust in view of the larger transactional context 
within which the benefit has been conferred.3 
Hence Section 62 is not merely an assertion that the plaintiff fails to state a 
claim, but a defense available only in specific circumstances. 
This general response implies that any case covered by Section 62 will 
sit in tension with whatever sections give rise to the "prima facie claim in 
unjust enrichment."  The strength of the prima facie claim that Section 62 
denies varies with each case, but each case will create at least some tension 
with other sections.  Thus, by Kull’s own lights, Section 62 serves as a 
                                                                                                                 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 (2011). 
 3. Id. § 62 cmt. a. 
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repository for cases with results that seem incongruent with those found in 
other sections. 
It would be troublesome enough if Section 62 were merely a 
repository for misfit cases; however, the situation is much worse.  In some 
of the cases, such as Illustration 1, the result and reasoning is so 
inconsistent with other sections that it ought to be rejected.  In other cases 
the result is consistent with other sections; in fact, the result follows from 
reasoning enunciated in other sections.  However, that these results are not 
explained in the other sections and instead find themselves amongst misfit 
cases in Section 62 implies that those results cannot be explained by other 
sections.  Hence, even the cases with correct results end up generating 
tension with the other sections. 
It might be objected that there is no such implication because Kull 
never claims that the explanations in Section 62 are the only possible 
explanations for the results therein.  He acknowledges that some results are 
overdetermined.  However, this objection is unconvincing for two reasons.  
First, as discussed above, Kull admits that all the cases in Section 62 
involve a prima facie case of unjust enrichment.  By making the prima facie 
claim salient, Kull thereby makes salient the sections that form the basis for 
the prima facie claim.  When he then goes outside the principles of those 
sections to explain the result, he creates a strong implication that doing so is 
necessary to reach the result.  Second, the rule of Section 62 is a defense 
against a claim in restitution and thus it serves as a response to an otherwise 
valid claim.  It would be odd to explain the denial of a claim as the result of 
an application of a defense if the claim itself is invalid.  This suggests that 
the results found in Section 62 can be reached only by applying the rules 
found therein.  Moreover, the reasoning used to explain results in Section 
62 is disconcertingly vague and expansive, more so than that found in the 
other sections of the Restatement.  Hence, even if Kull is not implying that 
the rule of Section 62 is the exclusive explanation of the results, he should 
still put the cases within the sections that better explain the results. 
The Mansfield-era equity underpinnings of Section 62 are another 
source of tension between Section 62 and the rest of the Restatement.  In 
the comment to Section 1, which elucidates general principles of restitution, 
Kull writes: 
A significant tradition within English and American law refers to unjust 
enrichment as if it were something identifiable a priori, by the exercise 
of a moral judgment anterior to legal rules.  This equitable conception of 
the law of restitution is crystallized by Lord Mansfield’s famous 
statement in Moses v. Macferlan:  "In one word, the gist of this kind of 
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action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged 
by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." . . .  
Restitution in this view is the aspect of our legal system that makes the most 
direct appeal to standards of equitable and conscientious behavior . . . . 
At the same time, the purely equitable account of the subject is open to 
substantial objections. . . .  In numerous cases natural justice and equity do 
not in fact provide an adequate guide to decision, and would not do so even 
if their essential requirements could be treated as self-evident. . . .  [Under 
this interpretation it] is difficult to avoid the objection that sees in "unjust 
enrichment,". . . at worst, an open-ended and potentially unprincipled 
charter of liability. 
. . . . 
The concern of restitution is not, in fact, with unjust enrichment in any such 
broad sense, but with a narrower set of circumstances giving rise to what 
might more appropriately be called unjustified enrichment.  Compared to 
the open-ended implications of the term "unjust enrichment," instances of 
unjustified enrichment are both predictable and objectively determined, 
because the justification in question is not moral but legal.4 
Here, Kull is rightly arguing that unjust enrichment, at least in its present 
form, is not an open invitation for judges to impose their moral sentiments 
upon the parties.  For example, morality likely requires that a pitiful 
pregnant widow receive help in keeping her home, but that does not give 
her a restitution claim against her landlord for refusing to lower her rent. 
Kull’s criticism of the hoary conception of equity is well-founded 
and persuasive.  Yet Section 62 states precisely such an antiquated view.  
Moses makes a triumphant return in the Reporter’s Note to Section 62, as 
Kull writes, "Illustrations 1–4 are all within the scope of the well-known 
hypothetical cases put by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan."5  He 
continues in the note to approvingly quote Mansfield’s opinion in Moses: 
This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought not 
in justice to be kept, is very beneficial . . . It lies only for money 
which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to refund . . . in all these 
cases [in which the plaintiff’s restitution claim is denied], the 
defendant may retain it with a safe conscience, though by positive law 
he was barred from recovering.6 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. at § 1 cmt. b (citations omitted). 
 5. Id. § 62 reporter’s note b (citations omitted). 
 6. Id. (quoting Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760)) 
(emphasis added). 
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It is startling to see Kull quoting the very same opinion that served in 
Section 1 as the exemplar of the theory of restitution that the Restatement 
rejects as flawed and outdated.  Kull argued convincingly that we ought to 
understand "unjust enrichment" as "unjustified enrichment," where 
"unjustified" refers not to a priori moral principles but rather to objective 
principles of positive law.7  Yet in the quotation above, Mansfield 
explicitly says that the decision is based on who in equity and good 
conscience (ex aequo et bono) ought to have the money, even though the 
positive law compels a different result.   Thus, the Reporter’s Note for 
Section 62 stands in direct contrast to the reasoning in Section 1.  In fact, 
they are not merely contrasting, but the comment to Section 1 explicit 
attacks the reasoning endorsed in the Reporter’s Note to Section 62.  This 
creates not just tension but open conflict between the two Sections. 
Accordingly, Section 62 is a source of great dissonance within the 
Restatement.  It stands in contrast with both the rules of specific sections 
and the general principles that were supposed to underlie all of restitution.  
If the purpose of the Restatement were purely normative—to lay out how 
the law of restitution ought to be—then it would be clear that Section 62 
should have been removed.  But the Restatement has more complicated 
goals.  It strives to present the best theory that explains restitution as it is 
found in the case law.  The reporter must balance trying to accommodate 
the results and reasoning in multifarious and sometimes contradictory 
cases with other theoretical virtues such as simplicity and consistency. 
Thus, before concluding that the Section should not have been 
included in the Restatement, it is necessary to determine whether 
removing the Section would have created gains in consistency that 
outweigh the corresponding losses in explanatory power (i.e., the 
reduction in the number and importance of the cases explained by the 
principles of the Restatement).  This section has shown that the gain in 
consistency would be significant.  The next two sections demonstrate that 
the loss in explanatory power is slight relative to the gains in consistency. 
III.  The Illustrations in Section 62 Are Either Wrong or Explained by 
Other Sections 
Before looking at the cases cited in the Reporter’s Note to Section 62, it 
is necessary to examine the illustrations.  As the illustrations are supposed 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See id. § 1 cmt. b.  
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to be representative of a number of cases, inspecting them allows us to 
quickly deal with a number of cases by proxy.  Most of the illustrations 
can be explained by rules from other sections.  The remaining illustrations 
are so inconsistent with the principles found elsewhere in the Restatement 
that they should be rejected as wrong.  Illustration 1 is as follows: 
A owes B $5000, but (unknown to either party) the debt is no longer 
enforceable because the statute of limitations has run.  A pays B, then 
learns that his payment could not have been legally compelled.  A has a 
prima facie claim to restitution of the mistaken payment (§ 6), but B is 
not unjustly enriched by A’s payment of a valid but unenforceable debt.  
B is not liable to A in restitution.  (For the contrasting outcome when 
A’s payment of a prescribed debt is compelled by a judgment that is 
subsequently reversed, see §18, Comment e, Illustration 8.)8 
A has a strong prima facie claim based on mistaken payment.  It is explicit 
in the illustration that he paid under the mistaken belief that the debt was 
enforceable, and it seems very likely that such a mistake is present in any 
case where one pays an unenforceable debt and subsequently sues to 
recover the payment in restitution.  B has no legal claim to the money.  
Thus, there has been unjustified enrichment.  What justifies denying A’s 
restitution claim if not an appeal to equity and good conscience? 
One purported justification is to argue that B does have a legal claim to 
the money.  This tact is taken by the court in Jordan v. Bergsma,9 which 
distinguishes a statute of limitations from a statute of nonclaim.  The 
Jordan court argued that when a statute of limitations has run, the legal 
obligation remains, but the law withholds any remedy for the enforcement 
of the obligation.10  Contrastingly, when a statute of nonclaim has run, the 
legal obligation is extinguished.  This justification is clever, but the 
distinction it draws is intolerably subtle and ad hoc.  The result of either the 
statute of limitations or the statute of nonclaim running is the same in all 
instances except those like Illustration 1.  The only practical difference 
between statutes of limitations and statutes of nonclaim is that the latter are 
not subject to equitable tolling, a distinction that is irrelevant in the context 
of Illustration 1.11 
Further, Kull does not draw the proffered distinction, so it is unlikely 
that Illustration 1 was supposed to represent cases where a statute of 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. § 62 cmt. b.  
 9. Jordan v. Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
 10. See id. at 320. 
 11. See Kubby v. Shaffer (In re Estate of Kubby), 929 P.2d 55, 56–57 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1996). 
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limitations has run but not cases where a statute of nonclaim has run.  If 
Kull intended to use such a subtle distinction to explain the result in 
Illustration 1, then surely he would have made it explicit.  Therefore, this 
response fails to address the gist of the Illustration, even though it may 
technically explain the result. 
A second possible justification is that B has a legal claim to money on 
the basis of a claim in restitution (i.e., B has no contractual claim on the 
money but he does have a claim for performance under an agreement that 
cannot be enforced pursuant to Section 31).  A valid restitution claim is a 
legal claim, so B would have a legal right to the money if he has a valid 
claim in restitution.  Unfortunately, Section 31 explicitly rules this out, 
stating, "[t]here is no claim under this section if enforcement of the 
agreement is barred by the applicable statute of limitations."12 
However, the second attempt points the way to a more plausible 
justification.  Perhaps giving A a claim in restitution defeats the policy 
behind statutes of limitations, which is the basis of her claim in the first 
place.  As the Supreme Court put it, "[l]imitations periods are intended to 
put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from 
sleeping on their rights,"13 to which we might add a policy to avoid 
burdening courts with trials based on stale evidence.  Denying A’s claim 
certainly lessens the incentive for B to timely prosecute his claim, but it is 
also true that in this Illustration, A is the party pursuing a trial based on stale 
evidence.  After all, A is bringing a suit that she could have avoided by 
paying attention to the statute of limitations and not paying B in the first 
place.  One might argue that allowing A to bring a suit on an old claim 
defeats the policy behind the statute of limitations.  Therefore, the argument 
goes, denying A recovery gives people in her position incentive not to make 
the mistaken payment or at least not to waste the court’s time with a suit 
based on stale evidence. 
This argument is misguided for four reasons.  First and foremost, the 
statute of limitations is directed at the holder of a claim.  A does not have a 
claim until she makes the mistaken payment, while B has a claim from the 
moment A defaults.  It is strange to think that the policy of the statute 
supports failing to penalize B in these circumstances.   
Second, the gravamen of A’s claim is not based on the old debt, but on 
her recent payment to B.  While evidence regarding the old debt is likely to 
come up, it does not form the basis for A’s claim.  In fact, it is in A’s 
                                                                                                                 
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 (2011). 
 13. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983). 
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interest to say as little as possible about the old debt, because she would do 
better casting her claim as paying B money by mistake.  Her claim is that B 
received money to which he has no legal entitlement; clearly this claim is 
not helped by evidence of a preexisting entitlement.  The evidence 
regarding the old debt is going to be introduced by the defendant as part of 
his defense under Section 62.14  Hence it is not A’s claim but B’s defense 
that requires the court to deal with old evidence. 
Third, it is not at all clear that denying A’s claim will have the 
practical effect of supporting the policy of the statute of limitations.  
Denying A’s claim clearly gives her less incentive to bring the suit and 
more incentive to make sure the statute of limitations has not run before she 
pays B.  However, the debtors are much less likely than creditors to take 
such considerations into account.  On the other hand, it also gives B, who is 
likely to be more legally sophisticated and hence more sensitive to legal 
incentives, less incentive to bring his claim in a timely manner.  Yet such a 
slight shift in incentives is not likely to alter the behavior of actual 
creditors, because no creditor is going to let a claim lapse on the slight 
chance that the debtor will voluntarily and mistakenly pay after the statute 
of limitations has run.  As denying A’s claim has little effect on the policy 
underlying statutes of limitations, that policy cannot justify the result of the 
Illustration. 
Fourth, in almost every realistic circumstance, a restitution claim of 
this sort will involve a request or inducement by B toward A.  It seems 
highly unlikely that a debtor who remained in default for more than the 
entire limitations period would decide to pay the debt without any action on 
the part of the creditor, only to later bring an action in restitution to recover 
the amount paid.  Although Illustration 1 stipulates that neither party knows 
that the statute of limitations has run, in reality A will not know, prior to 
discovery, that B lacks this knowledge.  Therefore in nearly every realistic 
case similar to the Illustration, there will be a claim for fraud based on B 
representing that he had an enforceable claim in addition to the restitution 
claim based on mistaken payment.15  The fraud case is not barred by the 
rule of Section 62, so the plaintiff will attempt to prove (1) that the statute 
of limitations has run and (2) that the creditor is aware that it has run.  His 
                                                                                                                 
 14. At best, A will stipulate to the existence of the debt, which B will not contest.  This 
also eliminates the concerns about old evidence.  Admittedly, there may still be dispute 
about the date on which the debt was created, but that dispute arises out of B’s defense, not 
A’s claim. 
 15. See, e.g., Clifton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 577 (1935); Jordan v. 
Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (1992). 
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attempt to prove (1) is going to involve all the same old evidence that the 
mistaken payment claim would have involved.  Hence the court has not 
avoided litigation dealing with stale evidence.  Furthermore, the fraud case 
is going to involve a messy determination of whether the creditor had 
knowledge regarding the statute of limitations, which could have been 
avoided by allowing the debtor to recover on her restitution claim. 
Thus, the result in Illustration 1 has no good explanation.  It sits in 
such direct contrast with the other cases of mistake in Section 6 that it ought 
to be dismissed as wrongly decided.  It also sits in contrast with Section 18, 
Comment e, Illustration 8, which is as follows: 
A sues B to enforce a $5000 debt.  B defends on the basis of the statute 
of limitations.  The trial court holds that the statute does not bar the 
action, and A obtains a judgment that B satisfies.  A’s judgment is 
reversed on appeal, on the ground that the action was time-barred.  It is 
conceded that B’s debt to A was legal and valid, and that it would have 
been enforceable were it not for the statute of limitations.  B is entitled 
to restitution nevertheless.16 
Kull tries to explain this discontinuity in the following manner: 
When the case is within this section, the debtor has been compelled by 
law to pay a claim that is not legally enforceable.  The need to remedy 
this misapplication of legal process—so that the law not stultify itself by 
requiring what it has declared may not be required—constitutes an 
important reason for restitution that is independent of the individualized 
equities of the parties.  This public concern with the integrity and proper 
application of legal coercion has no application to a case in which a 
debtor has paid, without compulsion, money to which the creditor had a 
valid but not a legally enforceable claim.17 
This explanation is inadequate because it fails to explain why the law 
should not be seen as stultifying itself when it denies A’s claim to 
restitution in Illustration 1.  The court in Illustration 1 is in effect enforcing 
a debt that it has declared not legally enforceable.  Refusing to grant 
restitution enforces the debt by providing it legal protection that it would 
not otherwise have.  Although this enforcement takes effect only after A has 
made a mistake, it is enforcement nonetheless.  The law still stultifies itself. 
Kull’s point about compulsion fares better than his contention about 
the law stultifying itself.  A’s payment in Illustration 1 is more voluntary 
than B’s in Illustration 8.  However, Kull overstates the degree of this 
                                                                                                                 
 16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 18 cmt. e (2011). 
 17. Id. 
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difference.  B faces a judgment against him, but he does have the option of 
posting a bond pending appeal.18  While this option certainly does not eliminate 
the element of compulsion facing B, it does lessen the degree of compulsion 
involved.  Moreover, A in Illustration 1 is acting under the assumption that she 
could be subject to a judgment against her, which no doubt constrains her choice.  
Finally, both Illustrations can be cast as instances of the same mistake.  A in 
Illustration 1 and B in Illustration 8 both mistakenly believes that they have a 
legal obligation to pay a debt, and both pay their respective debts on the basis of 
that belief.  Yet under Section 62, only one of them gets restitution. 
Hopefully it is clear that Illustration 1 can be rejected without doing much 
violence to the Restatement.  Turning to Illustrations 2 and 3,* they read as 
follows: 
2. A owes B $5000.  Intending to pay C, another creditor, A sends 
$5000 to B who accepts the payment despite notice of A’s mistake.  
(B’s notice of A’s mistake means that B is not entitled to defend as a 
payee for value by the rule of § 67.)  A has a prima facie claim to 
restitution of the mistaken payment (§ 6), but B is not unjustly 
enriched by A’s unintended payment of a valid debt.  B is not liable 
to A in restitution. 
3.* Receiver of insolvent Association issues an assessment against each 
Member in the amount of $1000.  Some Members pay the 
assessment, but others resist.  In litigation between Receiver and 
recalcitrant Members, it is determined that the duty of the Members 
runs only to Association’s Creditors, not to Association itself.  In 
consequence, Receiver had no legal authority to compel payment of 
the assessment.  Nevertheless, Members who paid the assessment 
have no claim against Receiver (who has since made payment over 
to Creditors, Section 65), nor against Creditors (who have a defense 
by the rule of this section).  Paying Members are entitled to 
restitution from nonpaying Members by the rule of § 23.19 
Illustration 3* can be explained via the creditors qualifying under 
Section 67 as payees for value without notice, but Illustration 2 cannot.  Both 
Illustrations can be explained as the court consolidating two different 
judgments in the name of efficiency:  (1) a judgment that the defendant is 
liable in restitution and (2) a judgment that the plaintiff is liable on the debt.  
                                                                                                                 
 18. See id. § 62 reporter’s note c. 
 19. Id. § 62 cmt. b. 
 * This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section 
62 has since been removed from the final version.  Subsequent references to this now-
removed Illustration will be marked with an asterisk.  References to Illustration 3 of Section 
62 without an asterisk refer to the final version of the Restatement. 
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The court allows (1) to be offset by (2) with the result that the defendant 
owes no money.  This explanation works well enough for Illustration 3,* 
where there is no explicit concern that other creditors will go unpaid, but it is 
a poor explanation of Illustration 2. 
To see why that explanation is unsatisfactory, the context in which it 
makes sense for A to bring a restitution claim must be considered.20  If both 
debts are enforceable and A is able to pay both of them, then the explanation 
above is adequate.  However, in such a situation, it does not make sense for A 
to sue B in the first place, because even if A wins, he will still have to pay B 
eventually and it is doubtful that B will be hesitant to enforce the debt after 
losing in court.  It  makes sense for A to sue only when he is unable to pay 
both of his debts and must decide to default on one of the two debts.  He may 
choose to default on his debt to B for a number of reasons: the contract with 
the other creditor (C) might have a severe liquidated damages clause or C 
might be an important supplier in A’s line of work and hence A cannot afford 
to upset him.  Whatever his reason, he finds his plans irreversibly thwarted as 
result of a mistake, while B keeps the money despite having notice of the 
mistake. 
More importantly, this leaves C at least partially unpaid.  C has a prima 
facie claim in restitution against B under the rules of Section 47 and 48 for 
benefits received by defendant from a third party.21  Yet this claim must fail, 
because Section 62 deems B not unjustly enriched.  In effect, B receives a 
priority superior to that of C as a result of the mistake.  Further, Illustration 2 
anomalously allows a defendant to retain a benefit despite having notice that 
it was received as a result of a mistake. 
In light of the aforementioned concerns, Illustration 2 is simply wrong 
and should be removed from the Restatement.  Illustration 3, on the other 
hand, is correct and nicely explained by Section 67 or as the result of 
offsetting a restitution claim with the defendant’s claim on the debt.  The 
remaining illustrations can be dealt with rather easily.  Illustration 3 is as 
follows: 
3. A agrees to settle a debt by giving B a promissory note for $5000, 
payable in two years with interest.  By a clerical error, the note 
delivered by A to B omits any reference to interest.  The note is 
                                                                                                                 
 20. The actual case upon which Illustration 2 is based is examined infra Part IV.  The 
case itself differs substantially from Illustration 2. 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 47, 48 
(2011). 
 * This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section 
62 has since been removed from the final version.3 
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thereafter negotiated by B to C, and by C to D, all parties acting 
in the mistaken belief that the note calls for payment of interest.  
At maturity, A pays D $5000 plus accrued interest of $600.  
When he examines the canceled instrument, A discovers that 
interest was not due by its terms; whereupon A sues D to 
recover $600 by the rule of § 6.  D is not liable to A in 
restitution, because (viewing the transaction as a whole) D has 
not been unjustly enriched at A’s expense.22 
This result can be explained as repeated applications of the contract 
doctrine of reformation.23  In every one of the transactions, the parties’ 
intentions involved a note for $5,000 plus interest.  A does not have a claim 
in restitution because D has a legal right to have the note reformed to 
include interest as between himself and C.  C has a right to have the note 
reformed to include interest as between himself and B.  B has the right to 
have the note reformed as between himself and A.  It is safe to assume that 
each of the intermediaries would want the note reformed to avoid liability 
for the interest, so the court simply follows the chain of reformations back 
to the beginning. 
Illustration 4 is as follows:   
3. A pays B $5000 in settlement of A’s losses in an honest poker 
game.  Under local law, a gambling debt of this kind is illegal 
and unenforceable; but (unlike the law of some jurisdictions) 
no statute authorizes the recovery of such a payment once 
made.  A’s payment of an illegal obligation might give him a 
prima facie claim to recover $5000 by the rule of § 32, but B is 
not unjustly enriched by the receipt of money won by an honest 
wager.  (The fact that A had a fair chance of winning means 
that A has received "the counterperformance specified by the 
parties’ unenforceable agreement" within the meaning of 
§ 32(2).)  B is not liable to A.24 
As Kull points out in the parenthetical, this result can be explained by 
applying Section 32(2)’s provision stating that there is no unjust enrichment 
if the plaintiff received the counterperformance specified by the parties’ 
unenforceable agreement.25 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. § 62 cmt. b. 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 (1967). 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 cmt. b 
(2011). 
 25. It seems to me that A should be allowed restitution under § 32(1), which states:  
"[r]estitution will be allowed, whether or not necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if 
restitution is required by the policy of the underlying prohibition."  Id. § 32.  Nevertheless,  
this is a difference of opinion regarding the best way to enforce the policy underlying 
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Finally, Illustration 5 reads: 
4. Employee acts in an emergency to save the life of Employer, 
sustaining crippling injuries as a result.  (Compare § 20, 
Illustration 7.)  Believing that he faces legal liability for 
Employee’s injuries, Employer continues for several years to pay 
Employee a portion of his former wages.  When Employer is 
later advised (correctly) that applicable law gives him total 
immunity from Employee’s claims, Employer discontinues these 
payments and sues for restitution on the ground of mistake (§ 6).  
Restitution will be denied.  The reason is not that Employer acted 
under a mistake of law (see § 5, Comment g), but that under the 
circumstances Employee has not been unjustly enriched.26 
This Illustration is based on the famed case of  Webb v. McGowin,27 although 
Webb is a contracts case focused on whether an already conferred benefit can 
serve as consideration.28 
The result stands in contrast to Section 20, especially Illustration 7, 
where the non-professional rescuer is denied a claim in restitution against the 
rescued party.29  It is tempting to try to distinguish the cases based on the 
voluntariness of the exchange, along the lines of Kull’s attempt to distinguish 
Illustration 8 in Section 18 from Illustration 1 in Section 62.  In Section 20 
Illustration 7, the court refused to compel payment from the rescued party 
and thereby prevented an involuntary exchange.30  In Section 62 Illustration 
5, the payments were made voluntarily, hence the court protected payments 
voluntarily made.31  Yet the "voluntary" transaction in Section 62 is the result 
of a mistake, which normally gives rise to a claim in restitution under Section 
5.32  The only salient difference between Illustration 5 and those cases that 
fall under Section 5 is that Illustration 5 involves an act of rescue.  However, 
Section 18 states that the act of rescue does not ground a legal obligation.33  
Thus, Illustration 5 is at variance with the rest of the Restatement.   
Still, the result of Illustration 5 can be accommodated without making 
use of the rules of Section 62.  The disabled employee almost certainly has a 
                                                                                                                 
gambling prohibitions and not a disagreement about the underlying restitution principles. 
 26. Id. § 62 cmt. b.  
 27. Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. App. 1935). 
 28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  CONTRACTS § 86 cmt. d, illus. 7 (1967). 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20 (2011). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. § 62 cmt. b. 
 32. See id. § 5. 
 33. See id. § 18. 
1216 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1203 (2011) 
change of position defense under Section 65.34  This will block the restitution 
claim, which is the result in Illustration 5.  This will not, however, explain the 
result in Webb, which was the creation of an enforceable contract.35  
In sum, Illustrations 1 and 2 are incorrect because they are grossly 
inconsistent with the principles found in other sections of the Restatement, while 
Illustrations 3–5 (and 3*) can be explained using principles from other sections.  
However, before we can conclude that the Restatement should not have included 
Section 62, we must look at the case law that forms the basis of the illustrations.  If 
a large or prominent body of case law supports the results or reasoning found in 
Illustrations 1–2, then eliminating Section 62 would have resulted in a significant 
loss of explanatory power.  Likewise, if a large or prominent body of case law 
supports the reasoning used in Illustrations 3–5 (and 3*), then explaining them 
instead with alternative reasoning would have caused a similar decrease in 
explanatory power.  The next section undertakes this requisite analysis. 
IV.  The Cases Inadequately Support the Illustrations 
The support given to the Illustrations by the cases Kull cites fails to 
overcome the inconsistency the Illustrations generate within the Restatement.  
Illustrations 1–4 are all drawn from hypothetical cases discussed by Lord 
Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan.36  Mansfield wrote:  
It [an action for restitution] lies only for money which, ex aequo et bono, the 
defendant ought to refund: it does not lie for money paid by the plaintiff, 
which is claimed of him as payable in point of honor and honesty, although it 
could not have been recovered from him by any course of law; as in payment 
of a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations, or contracted during his infancy, 
or to the extent of principal and legal interest upon an usurious contract, or, for 
money fairly lost at play:  because in all these cases, the defendant may retain 
it with a safe conscience, though by positive law he was barred from 
recovering.37 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See id. § 65 reporter’s note c; see also Westamerica Sec., Inc. v. Cornelius, 520 P.2d 
1262 (1974); Woolsey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (W.D. Ark. 1988); State 
ex rel. Steger v. Garber, 1979 WL 207282 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).  But see United States v. Smith, 
182 F. Supp. 503, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
 35. See Webb, 168 So. at 196. 
 36. Moses, 2 Burr. at 1005. 
 37. Id. at 1012 (cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 62 reporter’s note b (2011)). 
 * This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section 62 
has since been removed from the final version. 
A SIN OF ADMISSION 1217 
While Moses is a famous case, it is worrisome that this portion of it serves 
as the basis for over half the illustrations in Section 62. 
The portion quoted above is dicta very far removed from the holding 
in Moses.  The quoted portion and all of Section 62 involve denying a 
plaintiff’s claim to restitution, while the court in Moses actually upheld the 
action for restitution.38  The discussion that Kull cites occurs in the midst of 
Manfield’s sermon extolling the virtues of unjust enrichment claims, which 
were new claims at the time.  Part of Mansfield’s attempt to encourage 
actions in restitution generally is arguing that  such actions will not produce 
results that are repugnant to the legal minds of his time.  This grand 
undertaking is hardly necessary to decide Moses; it is Mansfield pursuing a 
broad public policy goal.  Furthermore, Kull cannot claim that Mansfield’s 
rhetoric is an accurate outline of unjust enrichment, because in Section 16 
the Restatement itself allows a minor to rescind a contract he accepted, 
which contradicts one of Mansfield’s claims.39 
Moreover, Moses is over 200 years old, and hence is a bit outdated as a 
statement of the law of restitution.  In fact, Kull himself argues this very 
point in Section 1 where he argues that Mansfield’s equity-heavy 
conception of restitution should be supplanted by the more positivist 
conception captured by Kull’s term "unjustified enrichment."40  Thus, using 
Moses as the basis for the illustrations in Section 62 creates a dilemma.  On 
the one hand, Kull has claimed that Moses is a poor description of the 
current state of the law of restitution.41  On the other hand, he uses the very 
same dicta that he criticized from Moses as the basis for four illustrations in 
Section 62.42  One of these positions must be abandoned for the sake of 
consistency, and the former seems more accurate than the latter. 
Thus, Moses offers little support for keeping Section 62 unchanged.  
However, Kull cites other, more recent cases as well.  Illustration 1 is based 
on  In re South Shore Co-op Ass’n,43 Clifton Manufacturing Co. v. United 
States,44 and Jordan v. Bergsma.45  It is best to consider each case 
individually.  The only case from the last seventy years is Jordan, which 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 (2011).  
 40. See id. § 1 cmt. b. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. § 62 reporter’s note b. 
 43. In re South Shore Co-op Ass’n, 103 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 44. Clifton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1935). 
 45. Jordan v. Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
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was a state appellate court decision.46  Kull himself notes that it is 
"unlikely that the decision is a sound illustration of more general 
principles of unjust enrichment."47  Further, this decision makes use of the 
distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of nonclaim which 
was shown to be irrelevant to Illustration 1.48 
In addition to drawing the distinction between statutes of nonclaim and 
statutes of limitations, the court also justifies its decision on contractual 
grounds, writing: 
This principle [that the debt is not extinguished after the statute of 
limitations has run] is further supported by the general rule of contract 
law that a new promise to pay an obligation made after the statute of 
limitations has run on that obligation is still an enforceable promise.  [I]f 
a debtor makes a new promise to his creditor to pay a debt that has 
already become unenforceable by operation of a statute of limitations, 
this promise is enforceable in accordance with its own terms without 
any new consideration. It is supported by the "past consideration."  
Though the debtor was protected by a legal bar, he is regarded as still 
under a moral obligation to pay the barred debt. . . .  Corbin, Contracts 
§ 214, at 289–90 (1963).  The obligation is not erased by the statute of 
limitations but merely made unenforceable in court.49 
This contractual argument is worth noting because it provides a justification 
for the result in Illustration 1 that is not founded on principles of restitution.  
Section 82 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: 
1. A promise to pay all or part of an antecedent contractual 
or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor 
is binding if the indebtedness is still enforceable or would 
be except for the effect of a statute of limitations. 
2. The following facts operate as such a promise unless 
other facts indicate a different intention: 
a) A voluntary acknowledgment to the obligee, 
admitting the present existence of the antecedent 
indebtedness; or 
b) A voluntary transfer of money, a negotiable 
instrument, or other thing by the obligor to the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See generally id. 
 47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 reporter’s 
note b (2011). 
 48. See supra notes 9–18 and accompanying text. 
 49. Jordan, 822 P.2d at 329. 
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obligee, made as interest on or part payment of or 
collateral security for the antecedent indebtedness[.]50 
In cases like Illustration 1, applying this contract doctrine, which in 
effect allows a prior event to act as consideration for a present promise to 
pay, creates an enforceable contract upon the obligor’s payment.  As a valid 
contract preempts any restitution claim, the obligor has no claim in 
restitution.51  Hence the very case cited in the Restatement points the way to 
a clearer explanation than the one given by the Restatement.52  Therefore, 
Jordan offers little support to Illustration 1. 
Turning to the older cases, South Shore has a better pedigree than 
Jordan, for it is a Second Circuit opinion.53  Admittedly, the very brief 
opinion in South Shore states:  "[the plaintiffs’] position . . . [is not] bettered 
by the fact that they paid a debt against which the statute of limitations 
might have been pleaded."54  However, this judgment was secondary to the 
court’s determination that the plaintiff’s payment to a trustee in bankruptcy, 
to whom the plaintiffs owed no money, instead of the creditors, to whom 
the plaintiffs owed money, did not qualify as a mistake sufficient to void 
the transfer because the trustee was bound by law to give the money to the 
creditors anyway.55  Yet, it would be disingenuous to characterize the 
court’s rejection of the statute of limitations issue as dicta, for that step was 
necessary for the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s case.  South Shore  
unequivocally supports the reasoning in Illustration 1. 
That said, the discussion of the statute of limitations issue in Kelly 
Asphalt, cited by the court in South Shore to support its position, is dicta.56  
In Kelly Asphalt, the president and half owner of the plaintiff company paid 
                                                                                                                 
 50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82 (1979). 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 (2011). 
 52. It may be that the justification for this contract doctrine is based on the same 
equitable considerations discussed in § 62 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution.  
Whether or not those considerations create a tension in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts similar to one they create in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Even if they did generate a similar tension, that is no reason to keep 
Section 62 unchanged.  We ought not to allow a nettlesome doctrine from one area of the 
law to infect other areas.  That the doctrine fits poorly with one restatement is no reason to 
put it in another restatement. 
 53. South Shore, 103 F.2d at 336. 
 54. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 61 (1937) and Kelly Asphalt 
Block Co. v. Brooklyn Alcatraz Asphalt Co., 180 N.Y.S. 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920) 
(citations omitted)). 
 55. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 337–38. 
 56. See Kelly Asphalt, 180 N.Y.S. at 806. 
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a debt due to the defendant company, which was entirely owned by him, 
after the statute of limitations had run with respect to that debt.57  The court 
did say that the "Statute of Limitations may not be invoked and used by the 
plaintiff to enforce the return of moneys paid in good faith to discharge a 
debt honestly due."58  However, the court also found that "the directors of a 
corporation have power to waive a Statute of Limitations as against a debt 
justly due and owing."59  A mistake relating to the application of the statute 
of limitations cannot void a valid waiver of the right to raise a statute of 
limitations defense because the purpose of the waiver is to resolve the issue 
of the statute of limitations.60  Hence, if the president’s action is viewed as a 
waiver, then any claim to restitution based on the running of the statute of 
limitations is misguided. 
A stronger statement in support of the reasoning underlying 
Illustration 1 can be found in the 1906 case of House v. Carr,61 upon which 
Kelly Asphalt heavily relied.62  Justice Vann’s dissent states:  "[I]t is a 
general principle that the Statute of Limitations may be used as a shield but 
not as a sword."63  Yet the majority opinion does not go that far, merely 
stating:  "[I]t is settled law, as appears by the cases cited in my brother 
Vann’s opinion, that equity will not set aside as a cloud upon title a lien 
outlawed by the Statute of Limitations."64  Moreover, even the majority 
opinion’s tempered support for the reasoning behind Illustration 1 is 
mitigated by the fact that the New York legislature overruled its 
interpretation of the relevant statute of limitations with the addition of 
subdivision 4 to section 500 of New York’s Real Property Law in 1948.65 
Turning back to cases cited in the Restatement, Clifton seems to offer 
strong support for the reasoning of Illustration 1.66  Like South Shore, it is a 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 805–06. 
 58. Id. at 808. 
 59. Id at 809. 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 (2011) 
(stating  that "[a] claimant bears the risk of a mistake when (a) the risk is allocated to the 
claimant by agreement of the parties; (b) the claimant has consciously assumed the risk by 
deciding to act in the face of a recognized uncertainty; or (c) allocation to the claimant of the 
risk in question accords with the common understanding of the transaction concerned"). 
 61. House v. Carr, 78 N.E. 171 (N.Y. 1906). 
 62. See Kelly Asphalt, 180 N.Y.S. at 805. 
 63. House, 78 N.E. at 178 (Vann, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 174. 
 65. See Garden City Country Club, Inc. v. Aldworth, 19 Misc. 2d 352, 353 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1959). 
 66. See Clifton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 577, 578 (4th Cir. 1935). 
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federal circuit opinion that offers unequivocal support for the result in 
Illustration 1, stating:  "It is of great significance that the taxpayer was in 
truth indebted to the United States for taxes in the amount which it paid."67  
It is also similar to South Shore in that it offers a strained reading of the 
precedent upon which it relies.  In Clifton the plaintiff is a taxpayer who, 
"[o]n June 25, 1923, more than five years after the first return . . . executed 
a waiver effective for one year from date, wherein it consented to a 
determination, assessment, and collection of the taxes for the year 1918, 
under section 250(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921."68  He was suing to 
recover the taxes he paid on that assessment because the waiver was 
executed after the statute of limitations had expired.  There was ample 
precedent to establish that such a waiver was valid despite having been 
executed after the statute of limitations had run.69  Nevertheless, none of 
those cases discussed whether the taxpayer knew that the limitations period 
had expired when he signed the waiver.  Of all those cases, the most likely 
to involve a taxpayer with that knowledge was Burnet v. Chicago Railway 
Co.,70 and yet even the Clifton court admitted that "the decision [in Burnet] 
does not expressly show whether the taxpayer was also of the opinion that 
the period of limitations had not expired when the waiver was given."71  
This casts doubt upon the Clifton court’s assumption that the results in the 
aforementioned precedent would not change even if the taxpayers had 
demonstrated that they believed the limitations period had not expired. 
Furthermore, even granting the Clifton court that assumption, the 
court’s conclusion that the expiration of the statute of limitations provides 
no basis for a restitution claim does not follow.  The results in the 
aforementioned cases comport entirely with the substance of Section 5 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment.72  When a 
taxpayer executes a waiver allowing the IRS to assess taxes for a given 
year, either the waiver expressly allocates the risk of the limitations period 
running, or the taxpayer consciously assumes the risk that the period has 
run by deciding to act in the face of a recognized uncertainty, or  allocating 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 581. 
 68. Id. at 578. 
 69. See Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U.S. 485, 488 (1933); McDonnell v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 420 (1933); W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Burnet, 282 U.S. 283, 287 
(1931); Burnet v. Chicago Railway Equipment Co., 282 U.S. 295, 299 (1931); Stange v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 270 (1931). 
 70. Burnet, 282 U.S. at 295. 
 71. Clifton, 76 F.2d at 581. 
 72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 (2011).  
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such risk to him accords with the common understanding of the transaction 
concerned.  Any of these circumstances would bar his mistake claim under 
Section 5.73  Accordingly, Clifton’s analysis shares the same flaws as that of 
Kelly Asphalt; namely, it takes a mistake claim that fails because of the 
nature of the agreement—a waiver in both cases—and uses it to create a 
much broader rule regarding all restitution claims based on the expiration of 
the statute of limitations. 
As the preceding discussion shows, South Shore, Kelly’s Asphalt, 
House, and Clifton all offer some support for the reasoning underlying 
Illustration 1.  However, the age of the cases tempers the strength of this 
support.  The cases were all decided prior to 1940, when Mansfield’s 
equitable conception of restitution had greater currency than it does today.  
The weaknesses in their analyses, discussed above, further diminish the 
strength of their support.  Moreover, all of them except for Clifton were 
decided using the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law 
that the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment advocates 
abolishing.74  Thus, the Restatement does not fully accommodate those 
cases despite their inclusion in Section 62. 
Jordan provides similarly attenuated support.  Jordan is much more 
recent than the cases mentioned above, but it is also much more poorly 
reasoned.75  Even Kull admits that it is not useful as a statement of general 
principles of restitution.76  Additionally, the contract doctrine that creates a 
valid contract upon payment of an expired debt may be doing most of the 
doctrinal work in reaching the result in Jordan.77 
Having examined the strengths and weaknesses of the case law 
supporting Illustration 1, we can now answer the question of whether the 
support it gives is sufficient to overcome the advantages that would be 
gained by removing Illustration 1.  The weighing of theoretical virtues is a 
subtle and complicated matter.78  This portion of my argument is likely to 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See id. 
 74. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 336; House, 185 N.Y. at 453; Kelly Asphalt, 180 
App. Div. at 750; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 cmt. g 
(2011). 
 75. Jordan v. Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
 76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 reporter’s 
note b (2011). 
 77. Jordan, 822 P.2d at 319. 
 78. See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in THE 
ESSENTIAL TENSION 320, 320–39 (1977); David Lewis, New Work for a Theory of 
Universals, 61 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL.343, 343–77 (1983). 
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draw the most criticism, because I am arguing that the Illustration should 
have been omitted despite clear support in the case law.  Nonetheless, given 
the flaws of the aforementioned cases and that the Restatement cannot fully 
accommodate most of them regardless of their inclusion in Section 62, I 
think the cases fail to justify the inclusion of Illustration 1 in the 
Restatement. 
The cases underlying the rest of the illustrations from Section 62 can 
be more easily dismissed.  Illustration 2 is based on  the 120-year-old case 
of Pensacola & A.R. Co. v. Braxton.79  This case simply does not support 
the Illustration.80  The recipient of the money in Pensacola had no 
knowledge of the mistake, and hence has a defense as a payee without 
notice under Section 67.81  Further, the facts of Pensacola raised no concern 
that the other creditor would go unpaid.  Hence the court decided the case 
by consolidating two separate debts:  The judge refused to set off the 
plaintiff’s damages on a tort claim by the amount the defendant paid by 
mistake because the jury found that the defendant owed the plaintiff that 
amount as payment for damages from another incident.82  The case contains 
the rhetoric concerning forbidding restitution where the money can be kept 
in good conscience that one would expect in a case from the 1894, but it is 
merely rhetoric, nothing more.83 
Illustration 3* is based on the part of South Shore not dealing with the 
statute of limitations issue.84  The facts of the case support the Illustration, 
but the court’s reasoning does not.  The court cites the Restatement (First) 
of Restitution Section 60, which treats the existence of enforceable duty to 
transferee as a defense to a restitution claim.85  While the current Section 62 
incorporates many of the illustrations falling under the previous Section 60, 
Section 62 of the current version is clearly the progeny of the former 
Section 61, entitled "Existence Of Moral Duty By Transferor,"86 which was 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Pensacola & A.R. Co. v. Braxton, 16 So. 317 (Fla. 1894). 
 80. Compare Pensacola, 16 So. at 317, with  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
& UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 reporter’s note b (2011). 
 81. See Pensacola, 16 So. at 320; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 67 (2011). 
 82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 (2011). 
 83. See id. 
 84. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 336–38. 
 85. See id. at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 60 (1937)). 
 86. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 61 (1937). 
 * This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section 
62 has since been removed from the final version. 
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used by the South Shore court to justify its decision on the statute of 
limitations issue.87  Hence we cannot assume that the reasoning from the old 
Section 60, which the South Shore court uses,  is equivalent to the reasoning 
of the current Section 62.  In fact, treating the existence of enforceable duty 
to transferee as a defense to a restitution claim seems more in line with the 
reasoning found in Section 67 in the current version.88  Ergo, the reasoning 
upon which the court in South Shore relied is likely the reasoning currently 
found in Section 67, not Section 62, of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment. 
Illustration 3* is also supported by the 1870 case of Board of 
Supervisors v. Manny,89 in which the court ignored the technical deficiencies 
in the tax assessment and allowed the taxing authority to keep the money paid 
by the taxpayer.  However, it seems that the court thought the deficiencies in 
the assessment were insufficient to invalidate the tax.90  Moreover, the court 
believed that correcting the deficiencies would have resulted in the plaintiff 
owing the same amount of tax.  Thus the court’s reasoning can be explained 
as consolidation of (1) a judgment that the defendant is liable in restitution, 
and (2) a judgment that the plaintiff is liable on the debt.  The court allows 
(1) to be offset by (2) with the result that the defendant owes no money.91  
The absence of any other creditors in the case,92 and the high priority given to 
tax debt,93 eliminate the problems that doomed Illustration 2.94  Hence, Board 
of Supervisors offers little support for the reasoning in Illustration 3*.95 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION 
§ 60 (1937)). 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 (2011). 
 89. Bd. of Supervisors v. Manny, 56 Ill. 160 (Ill. 1870). 
 90. Id. at 162–63 (noting that the plaintiff was under a legal and equitable obligation 
to pay the tax). 
 91. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Bd. of Supervisors, 56 Ill. at 160–63. 
 93. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2006). 
 94. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 95. Here one may object that I am ignoring Restatement (Third) of Restitution & 
Unjust Enrichment Section 19, specifically cmt. f of that Section, which discusses the 
application of Section 62 to illegal taxation claims.  I am not.  In Section 19 Kull states that 
"a claim in restitution to recover payments of taxes has usually been treated as sui generis, 
and principles thought to be specially applicable to tax cases usually determine the 
outcome."  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT at § 19 cmt. a.  I 
treat them as such as well.  
 * This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section 
62 has since been removed from the final version. 
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Illustration 3 is based on the antiquated case of Buel v. Boughton.96  
Again, the facts support the Illustration, but it is not clear that the reasoning 
of the court follows that of the Illustration.  The Buel court clearly 
contemplates a string of liabilities based on reforming the note and finds that 
such a series would end with the same state of affairs in which the parties 
currently find themselves.97  The court efficiently applies all of those 
reformations in one fell swoop and thus bars the unjust enrichment claim.98 
Illustration 4 is based on the nearly bicentennial case of Babcock v. 
Thompson.99  It is perplexing that Kull chose to base an illustration in Section 
62 on this case.  He is correct in that the Babcock court takes "the denial of 
restitution for money ‘fairly lost at play’ . . . for granted."100  Yet, the holding in 
Babcock is that the doctrine of equitable disqualification/unclean hands bars the 
plaintiff from recovering money that the defendant cheated out of him in illegal 
gambling.101  Kull is obviously aware of this, for he uses Babcock as the basis 
for an illustration in the section on equitable disqualification.102 
If the cheated plaintiff is barred from recovering on the basis of equitable 
disqualification, then a fortiori the plaintiff who lost the money in fair play is 
barred from recovery as well.  Thus, the most charitable and plausible reason 
for the court in Babcock to assume that the plaintiff cannot recover money lost 
in fair gambling is on the basis of equitable disqualification—the same basis 
upon which they decided the case.  Why Kull would think otherwise, given his 
knowledge of the case, is puzzling. 
Finally, Illustration 5 is based on the famed case of Webb v. McGowin.103  
Webb is a contracts case dealing with whether a promisee’s past act of rescuing 
the promisor can serve as consideration to make the promise enforceable.104  
The court found that the past act of rescue could serve as consideration, 
writing:  
It follows that if, as alleged in the complaint, appellant saved J. Greeley 
McGowin from death or grievous bodily harm, and McGowin 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Buel v. Boughton, 2 Denio 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846). 
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subsequently agreed to pay him for the service rendered, it became a valid 
and enforceable contract.105 
Kull had to modify the case for the Illustration, because merely barring 
the restitution claim is not the remedy in the actual case, which was to 
make the promise a contract.  The principles in Section 62 only allow the 
promisee to keep the money he has already received,106 while the doctrine 
of Webb allows him to continue to receive payments in addition to the 
money he already received.107  Webb is commonly viewed as a contracts 
case, serving as part of the foundation for Section 86 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, entitled "Promise For Benefit Received."108 
Much like the contractual principle discussed in Jordan,109 the 
contractual principle followed in Webb creates a valid contract that 
thereby blocks any potential restitution claims.  As it did with Illustration 
1 and Jordan,110 the Restatement again incorporates a misfit contract 
doctrine at the expense of simplicity and internal consistency.  As a 
contracts case that does not comment on restitution, Webb does not 
support the reasoning behind Illustration 5. 
V.  Conclusion 
Sentimental lawyers cherish an old trope: they say that law 
works itself pure.111 
This Article urges that the Restatement should not have included 
Section 62.  In doing so it argues for three theses:  (1) Section 62 is a 
source of great dissonance within the Restatement, (2) Section 62 
produces holdings that are either wrong or attainable by using alternative 
principles, and (3) the support given to the principles of Section 62 by the 
case law is inadequate to outweigh the problems the Section causes, that 
is, the gains in consistency to be had from removing the Section are 
greater than the loss in explanatory power that results from the cases 
going unexplained. 
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The remonstration of (1) leaves, I think, little room for doubt.  (2) is 
more dubious, but not very much so.  (3) is certainly the most 
controversial.  To accommodate as many cases as possible is a laudable 
goal, but we ought to be careful lest it thwart other equally important goals 
such as consistency and simplicity.  (1) and (2) show that omitting Section 
62 would have significantly improved the law of restitution.  The law may 
work itself pure, but occasionally there are opportunities to help it along.  
The Restatement missed one such opportunity by including Section 62. 
  

